GREENVISSAGE EXPLAINS: WHY XIAOMI, NOT APPLE, IS REDEFINING THE FUTURE OF EVS?
When Xiaomi introduced its YU7 electric SUV in June 2025, the event went far beyond the unveiling of a new vehicle. It symbolised a shift in the global technology industry, a moment when a company known for making budget-friendly smartphones demonstrated that it could succeed in a field where the world’s most valuable technology brand, Apple, had failed. Within minutes of the announcement, the YU7 attracted hundreds of thousands of orders, crashing Xiaomi’s servers and sending its stock price upward. The sheer scale of consumer enthusiasm, combined with the timing of Apple’s quiet retreat from its own long-running car project, cemented Xiaomi’s reputation as the rare tech giant able to break into the automotive industry. Apple had once harboured similar ambitions. Its much-discussed Project Titan, launched in 2014, aimed to reinvent personal transportation. Apple assembled a formidable team of engineers, poached talent from Tesla, and spent billions of dollars with the hope of putting an Apple-branded car on the road. Yet after more than a decade of shifting strategies, internal disagreements, and repeated delays, the project was quietly wound down in early 2024. Apple executives struggled to agree on what kind of car to build, whether to pursue a self-driving vehicle, a premium electric sedan, or simply to focus on software partnerships with established automakers. The company’s perfectionist culture, which demanded complete control over both design and data, clashed with the realities of the car industry, where scale, manufacturing partnerships, and government regulation dictate outcomes. In the end, Apple produced prototypes but never delivered a commercial product, reinforcing the lesson that making consumer electronics is one thing, but mass-producing cars is an entirely different challenge.
Xiaomi’s trajectory could not have been more different. The company entered the 2020s facing a crisis in its core smartphone business. Competition from Chinese rivals such as Huawei, Oppo, and Vivo, combined with the US sanctions that closed off the American market, forced Xiaomi to look elsewhere for growth. Unlike Apple, which could afford to abandon its car ambitions and redirect resources into artificial intelligence, Xiaomi needed a bold pivot to survive. Electric vehicles offered that opportunity. The company already had years of experience making and selling a wide array of hardware products, from smartphones and laptops to smart home devices. More importantly, it had built strong supplier relationships in batteries, chips, and sensors, all of which were crucial for the emerging EV industry. The Chinese government, keen to turn the country into a global EV powerhouse, further supported this move with subsidies, tax breaks, and cheap financing. This necessity shaped Xiaomi’s approach. Rather than spend years debating what kind of car to build, Xiaomi prioritised speed. Its first model, the SU7 sedan, bore an uncanny resemblance to Porsche designs, earning it the nickname Porsche Mi in Chinese social media circles. Critics accused Xiaomi of copying rather than innovating, but the company’s strategy was clear: get a car on the road quickly, refine it over time, and focus on building scale.
The company’s retail strategy also mirrored the one it had perfected in smartphones. Xiaomi aggressively built showrooms across Chinese cities, ensuring that its cars were visible and accessible. By creating a network of over three hundred sales centres, it brought the car-buying experience closer to its existing base of loyal smartphone customers. At the same time, Xiaomi embedded its cars within its broader ecosystem. The vehicles came equipped with operating systems that seamlessly integrated with Xiaomi phones, tablets, and smart home devices. Owners could step into their cars and instantly sync navigation, entertainment, and even home appliances. This level of ecosystem stickiness, something Apple had envisioned but never executed, gave Xiaomi an enormous advantage in converting its tech-savvy consumer base into car buyers. Of course, the path has not been smooth. The SU7 faced quality complaints soon after launch, and a fatal accident involving the car tarnished its image. In April 2025, sales of the model dipped by more than fifty per cent, showing that brand loyalty could not fully shield Xiaomi from the unforgiving scrutiny of the car market. Production bottlenecks also plagued the company, with wait times stretching up to a year for certain models. Yet despite these setbacks, Xiaomi persisted, pushing forward with its second model, the YU7 SUV, which debuted in June with spectacular demand.